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Increasing the ﬂow of credit to lower-income house-
holds and communities has been the focus of many
public-sector programs, such as those of the Federal
Housing Administration and the Rural Housing Ser-
vice. Government regulation of private-sector activi-
ties is often used to bolster such lending. The most
prominent example of the latter approach is the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The CRA was
enacted in 1977 to encourage federally insured bank-
ing institutions (commercial banks and savings asso-
ciations) to help meet the credit needs of their com-
munities, including those of lower-income areas, in
a manner consistent with their safe and sound
operation.
In responding to the CRA, banking institutions
have sought to expand lending to lower-income popu-
lations in a variety of ways, but the approaches can
be sorted into two broad types, both typically involv-
ing special marketing and outreach. In one approach,
lenders have sought CRA-related customers who
would qualify for market-priced loans under tradi-
tional standards (underwriting guidelines) for credit-
worthiness. In the second type of effort, lenders have
sought customers by modifying their underwriting
guidelines or loan pricing.
To expand lending to lower-income populations
through either approach, many banking institutions
have developed or joined ‘‘CRA special lending pro-
grams,’’ which seek out and assist such borrowers in
a variety of ways. These programs vary greatly across
banking institutions, differ widely in terms of their
characteristics and how they are implemented, and
can often be an important element of a banking
institution’s CRA-related lending activities. Although
many institutions have offered special lending pro-
grams, some for many years, little systematic infor-
mation is available about them. To further the under-
standing of these CRA special lending programs, this
article provides new information on the nature of
these programs, with particular emphasis placed on
their characteristics and how these characteristics
relate to the performance (delinquency and default
rates) and proﬁtability of the loans extended through
them.
BACKGROUND
The CRA was enacted in response to concerns that
banking institutions were, in some instances, failing
to adequately seek out and help meet the credit needs
of viable lending prospects in all sections of their
communities. It directs the federal regulators of bank-
ing institutions (the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision) to
encourage the federally insured institutions they regu-
late to help meet community credit needs in a manner
consistent with safe and sound operations.
The CRA is likely to inﬂuence the behavior of
a banking institution primarily through two mecha-
nisms: an examination and ratings system and the
formation of public opinion. Under the examinations
and ratings system, regulators periodically visit the
institution to assess the degree to which its lending
is adequately serving its entire community. The
CRA regulations guiding these examinations—jointly
issued by the four federal banking agencies—
emphasize an institution’s record of serving the credit
needs of low- and moderate-income populations
within its CRA assessment area (see box ‘‘The CRA
Regulations’’). Each examination is followed by the
assignment of a rating that is based on both quantita-
tive and qualitative measures of the institution’s
performance.
An important aspect of the examination and ratings
system is the statutory provision that requires regula-
tors to consider the record of a banking institution in
meeting the goals of the act when deciding on appli-
cations from that institution. In considering an appli-
cation from an institution with a performance prob-
lem under the CRA, the regulators can—depending
on the degree of the problem—potentially deny the
application or require the institution to meet certain
conditions in order to obtain approval.
A second mechanism by which the CRA can inﬂu-
ence the behavior of banking institutions is through
the force of public opinion. In August 1989 the
Congress amended the CRA to require each banking
institution to allow public inspection of its examina-
tion ratings and supporting written evaluation. Such
disclosure can inﬂuence the relationships that bank-
ing institutions have with potential investors, deposi-tors, and borrowers. It may, for example, inﬂuence
the nature and extent of public comments received on
an application for a merger or acquisition. It may also
inﬂuence decisions made by potential depositors, who
may direct their funds to those institutions with the
highest CRA performance ratings.
Banking institutions thus have incentives to
respond to the CRA. First, banking institutions have
an incentive to engage in CRA-related activities to
enhance their CRA performance rating. In addition,
they have an interest in maintaining a good public
image, which may be supported by a good CRA
performance rating or by other CRA-related activi-
ties. Moreover, because of the potentially important
role that CRA performance ratings and public com-
ments can play in applications, such as for mergers
and acquisitions, those banking institutions that
anticipate making such applications are likely to be
particularly sensitive to CRA considerations.
In spite of a wealth of experience by banking
institutions in undertaking CRA-related lending
activities, little systematic information has been pub-
licly available about those activities. For example,
while banking institutions are known to use third
parties to help reach certain targeted populations,
little information is available on the nature and pre-
valence of these relationships.
Also, there is reason to believe that the overall
performance and proﬁtability of CRA-related loans
may differ from those of loans extended to other
The CRA Regulations
The regulations that implement the CRA set forth three tests
by which the performance of most large retail banking
institutions is evaluated: an investment test, a service test,
and a lending test.
The investment test considers a banking institution’s
qualiﬁed investments that beneﬁt the institution’s assess-
ment area or a broader statewide or regional area that
includes its assessment area.1 A qualiﬁed investment is a
lawful investment, deposit, membership share, or grant that
has community development as its primary purpose.
The service test considers the availability of an institu-
tion’s system for delivering retail banking services and
judges the extent of its community development services
and their degree of innovativeness and responsiveness.
Among the assessment criteria for retail banking services
are the geographic distribution of an institution’s branches
and the availability and effectiveness of alternative systems
for delivering retail banking services, such as automated
teller machines, in low- and moderate-income areas and to
low- and moderate-income persons.
The lending test involves the measurement of lending
activity for a variety of loan types, including home mort-
gage, small business, and small farm loans. Among the
assessment criteria are the geographic distribution of lend-
ing, the distribution of lending across different types of
borrowers, the extent of community development lending,
and the use of innovative or ﬂexible lending practices to
address the credit needs of low- or moderate-income indi-
viduals or areas.
1. For purposes of evaluating CRA performance, each institution must
delineate the geographic areas that constitute its CRA assessment area. For a
retail-oriented banking institution, the institution’s CRA assessment area
must include the areas in which the institution operates branches and deposit-
taking automated teller machines and any surrounding areas in which it
originated or purchased a substantial portion of its loans. For a more
complete description of these issues, see 12 CFR 228.41.
For the lending test, the regulations implementing the
CRA require the federal banking regulatory agencies to
evaluate the geographic distribution of a banking institu-
tion’s lending in two ways: (1) the proportion of all the
institution’s loans that are extended within its assessment
area and (2) for loans within the institution’s assessment
area, their distribution across neighborhoods of differing
incomes. In the latter measure, lending in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods is weighted heavily in
CRA performance evaluations.2
The CRA regulations also require the banking agencies
to evaluate the distribution of a banking institution’s lend-
ing within its assessment area across borrowers of different
economic standing. This provision was added as part of
revisions made to the CRA regulations in 1995. The exact
deﬁnition of economic standing varies with the loan product
being examined. For residential mortgage lending products,
CRA assessments consider the distribution of loans across
low-, moderate-, middle-, and upper-income borrowers,
with a special focus on lending to low- and moderate-
income borrowers.3 For small business lending products,
assessments consider the distribution of small loans (loans
of $1 million or less) across businesses with differing levels
of revenue, with a particular focus on loans to ﬁrms with
annual revenues of $1 million or less.
2. The distribution of loans by neighborhood income is assessed for four
income groups: low, moderate, middle, and upper. In a low-income area
(typically a census tract), the median family income is less than 50 percent of
the median family income for the broader area (such as a metropolitan
statistical area or the nonmetropolitan portion of a state) as measured in the
most recent decennial census. In a moderate-income area, the median family
income is at least 50 percent and less than 80 percent of that for the broader
area. In a middle-income area, the percentage ranges from at least 80 percent
to less than 120 percent. And in an upper-income area, the percentage is at
least 120 percent.
3. Borrower income categories follow the same groupings as those for
neighborhoods but rely on the borrower’s income relative to that of the
concurrently measured median family income of the broader area (metropoli-
tan statistical area or nonmetropolitan portion of the state).
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resulting from special marketing and outreach and
from modiﬁed underwriting or loan pricing may
make CRA-related loans less proﬁtable than other
loans.
Moreover, the performance and proﬁtability of
CRA-related loans, whether or not they were origi-
nated through extra efforts or nontraditional stan-
dards, may differ from those of non-CRA-related
loans simply because the two loan groups have differ-
ing characteristics. CRA-related loans might, for
example, be smaller on average than other loans,
which would make them relatively costly to originate
and administer, or they might be less likely than other
loans to be prepaid, a tendency that would also affect
their proﬁtability.1 Despite widespread interest in the
topic, little has been known about the performance
and proﬁtability of the loans that are made in con-
formity with the CRA regulation.
To learn more about CRA-related lending activi-
ties, the Congress in November 1999 asked the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to con-
duct a comprehensive study of the issue.2 To this end,
the Board conducted a special survey of the largest
retail banking institutions to collect information on
their lending experiences (see box ‘‘Participation in
the Survey’’).3 The survey was in two parts. Part A
focused on an institution’s total lending and its CRA-
related lending in four broad loan product categories:
one- to four-family home purchase and reﬁnance
lending, one- to four-family home improvement lend-
ing, small business lending, and community develop-
ment lending.
In part B, the survey gathered extensive informa-
tion on CRA special lending programs, deﬁned as
programs that banking institutions have established
(or participate in) speciﬁcally to enhance their CRA
performance, even if these programs may have been
established for other reasons as well. Because these
programs are often an important element of a banking
institution’s overall efforts to comply with the CRA,
the survey collected information on many of their
characteristics, including the performance and proﬁt-
ability of the lending extended under the programs.
Responses to part B of the survey provide the data
that form the basis of the analysis presented in this
article. The analysis focuses primarily on CRA spe-
cial lending programs exclusively offering home pur-
chase and reﬁnance loans, as survey responses indi-
cated that most special lending programs were of this
type.
SURVEY RESPONSES REGARDING CRA SPECIAL
LENDING PROGRAMS
The Federal Reserve Board survey is the ﬁrst system-
atic collection of information on the characteristics,
performance, and proﬁtability of CRA special lend-
ing programs from a broad base of institutions. As
such, it provides a unique opportunity to learn about
the characteristics of CRA special lending programs
and relate these characteristics to the performance
and proﬁtability of programs.
1. Lower-income homeowners may have lower rates of mobility
than other homeowners and consequently a reduced propensity to
prepay their home purchase loans. The reduced propensity would
increase the value of the loan to the lender during periods of falling
interest rates but decrease it when interest rates are rising.
2. Section 713 of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999
(P.L. No. 106-95).
3. A report summarizing the major ﬁndings of the survey was
submitted to the Congress and made available to the public on July 17,
2000. The report and the survey questionnaire are available on
the Federal Reserve Board’s web site, at www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/surveys/CRAloansurvey.
Participation in the Survey
Participation by banking institutions in the Federal
Reserve Board’s Survey of the Performance and Proﬁt-
ability of CRA-Related Lending was voluntary. On Janu-
ary 21, 2000, each prospective respondent was mailed a
copy of the questionnaire accompanied by a cover letter
from Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
explaining the purpose of the survey and seeking volun-
tary cooperation in the study. The sample of institutions
selected to participate in the survey consisted of roughly
the largest 500 retail banking institutions—400 commer-
cial banks and 100 savings associations. The sample was
limited to the largest banking institutions because they
account for the vast majority (estimated at more than
70 percent) of CRA-related lending nationwide. Survey
responses were received from 143 banking institutions—
114 commercial banks and 29 savings associations.
Despite their relatively small number, the 143 survey
respondents accounted for about one-half of the assets of
the more than 10,000 U.S. banking institutions in exist-
ence as of December 31, 1999.
Response rates varied markedly by the asset size of the
institution. More than 80 percent of the largest surveyed
banking institutions (assets of $30 billion or more as of
December 31, 1999) returned a survey (27 out of
33 sampled institutions in this asset category). In con-
trast, only about 19 percent (72 out of 363) of the
smallest surveyed banking institutions (assets of between
$0.950 billion and $4.999 billion) responded. Institutions
with assets of between $5 billion and $29.999 billion had
a response rate of about 40 percent.
CRA Special Lending Programs 713In the survey, banking institutions were asked to
provide detailed information on the 1999 activity of
their CRA special lending programs, deﬁned as any
housing-related, small business, consumer, or other
type of lending program that the institution uses
speciﬁcally to enhance its CRA performance.4 For
the survey, CRA special lending programs could
include special programs offered or developed in
conjunction with third parties, such as lending con-
sortiums, nonproﬁt organizations, or government
agencies that offer special lending programs in which
an institution participates.5
The survey was sent to the 500 largest retail
banking institutions in existence at the end of 1999—
400 commercial banks and 100 savings associations.
Of these, 143 institutions responded (table 1).6
Respondents offered or participated in 622 CRA spe-
cial lending programs in 1999. Seventy-three percent
of the responding institutions offered at least 1 CRA
special lending program; on average the institutions
with programs offered about 6 programs. To limit the
burden of responding to the survey, the survey sought
detailed information on only the 5 largest of a bank-
ing institution’s CRA special lending programs
(measured by dollar volume of originations in 1999),
a restriction that produced detailed information for
341 programs. These 341 programs are estimated
to account for 91 percent of the loan dollars that
responding institutions extended under CRA special
lending programs in 1999.
CRA special lending programs are often complex
in design and can involve many features and a diverse
4. A program would meet this deﬁnition only if one of the pro-
gram’s documented purposes was to enhance the institution’s CRA
performance.
5. However, traditional government-backed lending programs, such
as those offered by the Federal Housing Administration, the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, and the Small Business Administration,
were not considered to be CRA special lending programs for the
purposes of the survey unless an institution provided a special
enhancement, such as credit counseling, a homebuyer education pro-
gram, or a waiver or reduction of loan fees.
6. One of these institutions did not answer any questions in the
special lending portion of the survey and is excluded from the tables.
Respondent institutions are grouped into three asset-size categories:
$0.950 billion to $4.999 billion; $5 billion to $29.999 billion; and
$30 billion or more. Institutions in the ﬁrst two categories together
(assets of $0.950 billion to $29.999 billion) will be referred to below
as ‘‘smaller’’ institutions, and those with assets of $30 billion or more
will be referred to as ‘‘large.’’
1. Banking institutions and CRA special lending programs covered in survey, by size of institution, 1999
Item All reporting
institutions
Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Institutions
Number responding to survey1 .................................. 142 72 43 27
Offering at least one program
Number ..................................................... 103 48 31 24
Percent ...................................................... 73 67 72 89
Number of programs
Among the ﬁve largest at each institution2 ........................ 341 138 116 87
Smaller than the ﬁve largest at each institution .................... 281 31 139 111
Total
Number ..................................................... 622 169 255 198
Mean number per institution offering at least one program ...... 6.0 3.5 8.2 8.3
Number of programs among the ﬁve largest at each institution,
by type of loan offered
One- to four-family home, purchase and reﬁnance only3 ........... 247 98 83 66
Small business only ............................................ 27 17 4 6
Other .......................................................... 67 23 29 15
One- to four-family home, home improvement only ............ 17764
Multifamily only ............................................. 16682
Consumer only ............................................... 5131
Commercial only ............................................. 4130
Other4 ....................................................... 25898
Programs among the ﬁve largest at each institution
operated by a distinct unit or department of institution
Percentage of institutions among those with programs ............. 67 60 77 92
Percentage of programs among the ﬁve largest .................... 63 56 75 80
1. Excludes one institution (in the middle size category) that did not respond
to the special lending portion of the survey. For more information on the sample
size, see text box ‘‘Participation in the Survey.’’
2. Institutions were asked for detailed information on only the ﬁve largest of
their programs (measured by dollar volume of 1999 originations).
3. Programs reported in this row and the remaining rows of this table are
from among the 341 reported by all institutions to be among their 5 largest. Data
in subsequent tables involve only the 247 programs reported in this row
(referred to hereafter as CRA special mortgage programs).
4. Programs identiﬁed as such by survey respondents and programs that offer
more than one type of loan.
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operation of some of these programs requires consid-
erable training and experience. To facilitate the efﬁ-
cient implementation of these programs, many bank-
ing institutions establish distinct units or departments
within the institution to run their CRA special lend-
ing programs. Among the banking institutions that
offered at least one special lending program, 67 per-
cent had at least one program operated by a distinct
unit or department (table 1). Larger banking institu-
tions in the sample were more likely than smaller
institutions to offer programs through a distinct
unit or department. Overall, of the special programs
that each institution reported to be among its ﬁve
largest, 63 percent were operated by a distinct unit or
department.
Before the survey was conducted, CRA special
lending programs had been known to involve a range
of credit products, but no information was available
on the incidence of special lending programs across
loan product categories. Results of the survey
revealed that 72 percent of the programs (and 89 per-
cent of the program dollars originated in 1999) for
which banking institutions provided detailed informa-
tion focused on one- to four-family home purchase
and reﬁnance loans. The next largest category of
CRA special lending programs, comprising 8 percent
of reported programs, focused on small business
loans. The remaining programs cover a variety of
loan products, none of which individually accounted
for a substantial proportion of all programs.
Because CRA special lending programs concen-
trating on home purchase and reﬁnance loans consti-
tute most of the CRA programs reported in the sur-
vey, the analysis in the remainder of this article
(covering the data in table 2 and subsequent tables)
focuses exclusively on these programs. The relatively
small number of programs that were reported to focus
on small business and other lending products pre-
cludes a comprehensive analysis of them. For sim-
plicity, we will hereafter usually refer to CRA special
lending programs that focus on home purchase
and reﬁnance loans as ‘‘CRA special mortgage
programs.’’
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRA SPECIAL
MORTGAGE PROGRAMS
The survey was designed to collect information that
would shed light on the diversity of characteristics,
both within and across banking institutions, among
CRA special lending programs. In addition, because
it was recognized that banking institutions may have
established these programs for a variety of reasons
that go beyond their efforts to enhance their CRA
performance, the survey asked respondents to pro-
vide information on both the reasons for which they
originally adopted these programs and the current
beneﬁts they receive from the programs.
In table 1, data in the ‘‘all reporting institutions’’
column were taken from the 142 institutions respond-
ing to part B of the survey. In the analysis that
follows (covering data reported in table 2 and sub-
sequent tables), ﬁgures in the ‘‘all-institutions esti-
mate’’ column are also based on the responses of
the 142 institutions, but these responses have been
weighted so that the ﬁgures represent an estimate of
what the responses would have been if all 500 institu-
tions had responded to the survey and provided
answers to all applicable questions (see box ‘‘Calcu-
lating the ‘All Institutions Estimate’’’).
The Size and Age of Individual Programs
Survey responses indicate that in 1999 the dollar
amount of loans extended under all CRA special
lending programs made up a relatively small portion
of total CRA-related lending in that year for most
reporting institutions (see box ‘‘Survey Deﬁnition of
a CRA-Related Loan’’). In the case of home purchase
and reﬁnance loans, the proportion of CRA-related
home purchase and reﬁnance loan dollars that were
extended under CRA special mortgage programs was
only 4 percent for the median banking institution.
Among the institutions that had CRA special mort-
gage programs, the proportion was 18 percent for the
median institution. For about one-sixth of all institu-
tions in the survey, however, CRA special mortgage
programs accounted for more than 40 percent of their
CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance loan dol-
lars (data not shown in tables).7
In the aggregate, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams made up 21 percent of the total dollars of
CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance loans
originated by reporting institutions (and only 3 per-
cent of the total dollars of home purchase and reﬁ-
nance originations).8
Information reported also suggests that individual
CRA special mortgage programs are generally small.
For 1999, an estimated 31 percent of the CRA special
mortgage programs reported in the survey had total
7. The proportions of lending for home improvement and small
business that were conducted through CRA special lending programs
were much lower than for home purchase or reﬁnance.
8. Estimates are derived from responses to questions in part A of
the survey.
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cent had total originations of between $500,000 and
$2 million; only 18 percent had originations of more
than $15 million (table 2).
The size of CRA special mortgage programs varied
with the asset size of the banking institution, as
programs tended to be larger for the largest banks in
the survey (data not shown in tables). The median
size of CRA special mortgage programs for large
banks (those with assets of $30 billion or more) was
about $36 million; for the smallest banks in the
sample (those with assets of $0.950 billion to
$4.999 billion) the median size of CRA special mort-
gage programs was about $680,000.
Most of the CRA special mortgage programs that
were reported in the survey were established rela-
tively recently. More than half (62 percent) were
established after the CRA regulations were modiﬁed
in 1995 (table 2); only 6 percent of the programs
were established before 1990. This pattern is consis-
tent with the small size of many programs, as newer
programs tended to be smaller.
Reasons for Establishing CRA Special
Mortgage Programs and Current Beneﬁts
Banking institutions cite many reasons for originally
establishing or participating in CRA special mort-
gage programs (table 3). Responding to the credit
needs of the local community and promoting com-
munity growth and stability are the two most fre-
quently cited reasons. The third most frequently cited
reason (for 76 percent of these programs) was to
obtain a ‘‘Satisfactory’’ or ‘‘Outstanding’’ CRA rat-
ing. However, only 1 percent of CRA special mort-
gage programs are reported to have been estab-
lished only to obtain a satisfactory or outstanding
CRA rating. The fourth most frequently cited reason
(also mentioned for more than half the programs) was
to improve the institution’s public image.
The pattern of reasons for establishing programs
does not vary greatly by size of reporting institution
in most cases; but large banking institutions were
more likely than smaller institutions to cite a desire to
improve their public image, to maintain their market
Calculating the ‘‘All-Institutions Estimate’’
The appropriateness of the ‘‘all-institutions estimate,’’
reported in table 2 and subsequent tables, relies upon the
validity of the assumptions needed to construct it. Key
assumptions are those related to the treatment of sample and
question nonresponse. The proportion of banking institu-
tions that responded to the survey varied signiﬁcantly by
asset-size group (see preceding box ‘‘Participation in the
Survey’’); as a consequence, unless behavior is the same for
institutions across different asset-size categories, simple
averages based on the answers provided by respondents will
distort the picture of what the survey responses would have
been if all 500 institutions had provided answers to all
applicable questions.
To address this concern, the data in the ‘‘all-institutions
estimate’’ column are calculated, in part, on the basis of
adjustment factors reﬂecting the relative response rates for
respondents in the three asset-size classes. The sample
response adjustment factor for respondents with assets of
$30 billion or more is 1.2 (or 33 ÷ 27), that is, of the
33 institutions in the category, 27 responded). Similarly,
the sample response adjustment factor for respondents
with assets of $5 billion to $29.999 billion is 2.4 (or
104 ÷ 44); and for respondents with assets of $0.950 billion
to $4.999 billion, the adjustment factor is 5.0 (or 363 ÷ 72).1
1. This procedure assumes that the respondents within an asset-size cate-
gory are representative of all institutions in that category.
An additional adjustment problem in calculating
responses for the all-institutions estimate arises from the
fact that some questions were not answered by a signiﬁcant
proportion of respondents. For questions with a signiﬁcant
number of nonresponses (tables 7–11), an additional adjust-
ment factor, also based on asset size, was applied to correct
for the varying propensities within the asset-size classes to
answer questions.
The general procedure used to calculate question-
response adjustment factors was to assume that respondents
within an asset-size category that did not provide an answer
to a question would have the same response pattern as those
that did. Thus, the number of respondents who answered
each question was scaled up to represent those who did not
answer. Respondents for whom a question was not applica-
ble were not used in calculating the all-institutions esti-
mates. For example, if 24 respondents were asked a ques-
tion and 12 provided an answer, each of the 12 was
multiplied by 2 to represent a total of 24 institutions.
Question-response adjustment factors were calculated sepa-
rately for each asset-size category because the responses
varied by asset size.
Data in the all-institutions estimate column in tables 7–11
are computed with the question-response adjustments in
conjunction with the sample-response adjustments. For
example, if the 12 respondents in the example above were
large institutions, the total response adjustment for each of
the 12 institutions that provided an answer would be2×( 3 3
÷ 27), or 2.44.
716 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000share of lending, and to minimize the likelihood of
adverse public comment on their CRA record.
That only about three-fourths of CRA special mort-
gage programs were reportedly established to achieve
a satisfactory or outstanding CRA rating may be
somewhat puzzling, given that the survey explicitly
asked institutions to report only on special lending
programs that had as one of their documented pur-
poses enhancement of the institution’s CRA perfor-
mance. One possibility is that some of the programs
that support the CRA-related lending activities of
institutions are not considered by the institutions to
be ‘‘needed’’ to obtain a particular CRA rating. A
second possibility is that the support of CRA-related
activities is a documented purpose of some programs,
but a relatively minor one.
Banking institutions reported receiving a variety of
current beneﬁts from offering or participating in CRA
special mortgage programs. Obtaining either a satis-
factory or outstanding CRA rating was, again, the
third most frequently mentioned beneﬁt (for 80 per-
cent of the programs), but also as before, this was
cited as the only current beneﬁt for just 1 percent of
the programs. Responding to the credit needs of the
local community, promoting community growth and
stability, and improving the public image of the insti-
tution are also frequently cited current beneﬁts of
these CRA special lending programs.
Features of CRA Special Mortgage Programs
Almost all CRA special mortgage programs were
targeted to populations that are emphasized in the
CRA regulations: lower-income borrowers and bor-
rowers in lower-income neighborhoods. Most pro-
grams targeted both of these populations (table 4).
When only one population was targeted, it was much
more likely to be lower-income borrowers than
lower-income neighborhoods.
Third parties played a role in about three-fourths of
CRA special mortgage programs (table 5). Third
parties involved in the programs included public enti-
ties at all levels of government and a range of for-
proﬁt and nonproﬁt private-sector ﬁrms and organiza-
tions. Some programs (31 percent in the survey, not
shown in tables) involved the active participation of
multiple third parties.9
9. Programs at large banking institutions were more likely than
those at smaller institutions to involve multiple third parties. There-
fore the percentages shown in table 5 for each type of entity are larger
for large institutions than for smaller institutions even though the
likelihood of participation by any third party is about the same.




Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Size of program (loan dollars originated in 1999)
500,000 or less ................................................. 31 44 11 3
More than 500,000 to 2 million .................................. 28 32 25 8
More than 2 million to 15 million ................................ 24 21 29 24
More than 15 million ........................................... 18 3 35 65
T otal ........................................................ 100 100 100 100
Year program established
Before 1990 .................................................... 6 5 7 10
1991–94 ....................................................... 32 29 42 28
1995–97 ....................................................... 43 43 41 47
1998–99 ....................................................... 19 23 11 15
T otal ........................................................ 100 100 100 100
Note. See table 1, note 3, for scope of data in this and subsequent tables.
Components may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
1. Average of values for the three asset-size categories after adjustment; for
tables 2–6, adjusted value (not shown in tables) based on the rates of response
to the survey; for tables 7–11, adjusted value (not shown in tables) based on the
rates of response to the survey and to the particular question (for more informa-
tion, see text box ‘‘Calculating the ‘All-Institutions Estimate’’ ’).
Survey Deﬁnition of a CRA-Related Loan
In conducting the study of the performance and proﬁt-
ability of loans made in conformity with the CRA, the
Board used the current CRA regulations as a guide in
establishing a deﬁnition of a ‘‘CRA-related loan.’’ As
noted, the regulations require the banking agencies to
evaluate the geographic distribution of lending and the
distribution of lending across borrowers of different eco-
nomic standing (see box ‘‘The CRA Regulations’’). As a
result, for purchase and reﬁnance lending on one- to
four-family homes, a CRA-related loan was deﬁned to
mean any loan made within the banking institution’s
CRA assessment area to a low- or moderate-income
borrower (regardless of neighborhood income) or in a
low- or moderate-income neighborhood (regardless of
borrower income).
CRA Special Lending Programs 717Although their roles vary across programs, third
parties conduct a wide range of activities that contrib-
ute to the implementation of CRA special lending
programs, including activities that reduce the costs
and risks of default that banking institutions might
otherwise incur in extending credit to the populations
served by the special programs. The most frequently
cited activities were providing grants for down pay-
ments or other purposes, providing pre-loan educa-
tion or counseling to loan applicants, and helping
lenders identify prospective borrowers. Large bank-
ing institutions were more likely than smaller institu-
tions to use third-party services for applicant screen-
ing and for grants to cover the loan down payment,
while smaller institutions were more likely to use
third-party underwriting services, credit guarantees,
and subsidies to borrowers for fees they incur in
obtaining mortgage credit.
Apart from the efforts of third parties, many
features of CRA special mortgage programs directly
involved the banking institutions themselves
(table 6). The most frequently mentioned were more
ﬂexible underwriting criteria, a second review of loan
applicants to determine qualiﬁcations, special out-
reach and marketing activities, waived or reduced
fees, pre-loan education or counseling to applicants,
3. Reasons for establishing CRA special mortgage programs and their current beneﬁts to the banking institution,




Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Reasons for establishing program
Help earn a CRA rating of ‘‘Satisfactory’’ or ‘‘Outstanding’’
Cited as only reason .......................................... 1102
Cited as one reason among others ............................. 76 74 86 68
F o rar a t i n go f‘‘Satisfactory’’ ................................. 37 40 35 21
F o rar a t i n go f‘‘Outstanding’’ ................................. 52 42 75 59
Respond to credit needs of local community ...................... 95 93 99 96
Promote community growth and stability ......................... 80 74 92 91
Improve institution’s public image ............................... 51 40 76 65
Earn additional proﬁts .......................................... 46 39 65 42
Identify proﬁtablenewmarkets .................................. 44 41 53 41
Maintain market share in face of increased competition ........... 42 31 61 64
Minimize likelihood of adverse public comment on CRA record ... 31 22 47 52
Other .......................................................... 3343
Current beneﬁts from program
Helps earn a CRA rating of ‘‘Satisfactory’’ or ‘‘Outstanding’’
Cited as only reason .......................................... 1102
Cited as one reason among others ............................. 80 80 86 73
F o rar a t i n go f‘‘Satisfactory’’ ................................. 41 44 43 17
F o rar a t i n go f‘‘Outstanding’’ ................................. 53 45 71 66
Responds to credit needs of local community ..................... 94 92 99 94
Promotes community growth and stability ........................ 87 83 94 94
Improves institution’s public image .............................. 54 47 67 66
Earns additional proﬁts ......................................... 42 38 54 35
Identiﬁes proﬁtablenewmarkets ................................ 37 33 45 42
Maintains market share in face of increased competition ........... 50 38 73 71
Minimizes likelihood of adverse public comment on CRA record .. 38 30 54 52
Other .......................................................... 1120
Note. See notes to table 2, except that here components do not sum to 100
because respondents could give more than one answer.




Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Lower-income targets
Neighborhoods ............................................... 6 6 4 8
Borrowers ................................................... 22 24 18 17
Neighborhoods and borrowers ................................ 69 66 76 76
Other .......................................................... 3 4 2 0
Total .......................................................... 100 100 100 100
Note. See notes to table 2.
718 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000and reduced interest rates. The proportion of CRA
special mortgage programs that offered any given
feature varied somewhat across institution size
classes, although the smallest institutions were less
likely to conduct the two major services-type
activities—special outreach and marketing and pre-
loan education or counseling—and less likely to con-
duct a second review of applicants.
The alteration of customary underwriting standards
by banking institutions was a part of a large majority
(83 percent) of special mortgage programs. The most
frequently cited underwriting variances offered were
lower down payments; the acceptance of alternative
measures of credit quality, such as rent and utility
payment histories, in lieu of more traditional mea-
sures of credit risk; lower cash reserve requirements;
and higher debt-to-income ratios. A large proportion
of programs (58 percent) also allowed additional
ﬂexibility when reviewing an applicant’s employ-
ment history. The opportunity for borrowers to
qualify for credit using these additional underwriting
ﬂexibilities suggests that loans made under CRA
special mortgage programs may have elevated rates
of delinquency and default. Banking institutions may
offset these apparent additional risks through steps
they often take in conjunction with these underwrit-
ing variances, such as pre-loan education and coun-
seling and enhanced monitoring of borrower payment
patterns.
PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY OF CRA
SPECIAL MORTGAGE PROGRAMS
Performance and proﬁtability are important issues to
consider in evaluating the long-term viability of CRA
special mortgage programs and the effect of these
programs on the ﬁnancial condition of the banking
institutions that offer them.
Performance
To assess the performance of CRA special mortgage
programs, the survey focused on delinquency rates
and net charge-off rates, which are closely related to
default rates (see box ‘‘Measures of Performance’’).
The survey used two measures of delinquency—the
5. Third-party involvement in CRA special mortgage programs, by size of banking institution, 1999
Percentage of programs
Third-party types and activities All-institutions
estimate
Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Any ........................................................... 76 72 87 73
Type of third party (percentage of programs
with third-party participation)
Nonproﬁt organization .......................................... 47 46 40 71
Local government .............................................. 35 30 43 46
State government ............................................... 30 19 47 48
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac ....................................... 24 13 43 33
Federal Home Loan Bank ....................................... 22 20 25 23
Financial institution consortium ................................. 21 21 19 25
Federal government ............................................ 17 13 21 31
Other .......................................................... 2 3 0 2
Third-party activities (percentage of programs with
third-party participation)
Services ....................................................... 70 73 63 75
Pre-loan education or counseling for applicants ................. 57 60 47 67
Identiﬁcation of potential borrowers ........................... 49 47 49 63
Screening of potential applicants .............................. 33 34 26 40
Post-loan education or counseling for borrowers ................ 28 27 25 38
Underwriting ................................................ 16 23 6 6
Assistance in servicing account ............................... 15 17 10 15
Second review of loan applicants .............................. 3 4 0 6
Subsidies ...................................................... 71 70 69 81
Grants for down payment or other purposes .................... 60 59 58 71
Subsidizedinterestrates ...................................... 27 24 36 19
Subsidizedfees .............................................. 24 27 21 15
Tax relief (credits or exemptions) .............................. 3 1 3 17
Assumption of risk ............................................. 49 49 42 65
Subordinate mortgages ....................................... 36 33 35 60
Credit guarantees ............................................ 16 20 8 8
Miscellaneous .................................................. 13 6 29 17
Purchase of broker loans ...................................... 12 4 28 17
Other........................................................ 1 1 1 0
Note. See notes to table 2, except that here components do not sum to 100
because respondents could give more than one answer.
CRA Special Lending Programs 719percentage of loan dollars 30–89 days past due and
the percentage of loan dollars 90 days or more past
due or nonaccruing—that, like net charge-off rates,
are commonly used in the industry and are regularly
tracked and disclosed in regulatory reports ﬁled by
banking institutions.10 Both delinquency measures
are calculated as of December 31, 1999, and the net
charge-off rate is calculated over the calendar year
1999.
The relative performance of CRA special mortgage
programs varied with the measure of performance
considered. For delinquencies, survey responses indi-
cated that, on average, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams had lower rates than those for overall CRA-
related home purchase and reﬁnance lending but
higher rates than those for an institution’s total home
purchase and reﬁnance lending (table 7). For exam-
ple, the mean rate for loans that were delinquent
90 or more days or nonaccruing was 1.00 percent for
CRA special mortgage programs, 1.42 percent for
overall CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance
lending, and 0.78 percent for total home purchase and
reﬁnance lending.
On the other hand, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams performed better than total home purchase and
reﬁnance lending when performance was assessed
using median values. For example, the median per
program rate for loans that were delinquent 90 or
more days or nonaccruing was 0.07 percent for CRA
special mortgage programs and 0.53 percent for total
home purchase and reﬁnance lending.
For net charge-offs, the zero rate for more than half
of the CRA special mortgage programs could possi-
bly reﬂect the relative newness of many of the pro-
grams as well as the inﬂuence of a number of other
factors, including more intensive screening of pro-
spective borrowers, sometimes by third parties,
greater efforts to work with delinquent borrowers,
and policies encouraging increased forbearance for
such programs.
The performance of these programs appears to
vary with the asset size of the banking institution
operating the program. On average, CRA special
mortgage programs at large banking institutions had
10. For commercial banks and some savings associations, it is the
Report of Condition and Income (Call Report), and for the remaining
savings associations, the Thrift Institution Financial Report.
6. Program features and underwriting variances provided by institutions in their CRA special mortgage programs,
by size of banking institution, 1999
Percentage of programs
Feature or underwriting variance All-institutions
estimate
Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars)
950–4,999 5,000–29,999 30,000 or more
Program feature1
Services ....................................................... 67 58 86 83
Special outreach and marketing activities ...................... 52 40 74 79
Pre-loan education or counseling for applicants ................. 45 38 60 52
Post-loan education or counseling for borrowers ................ 8 9 5 11
Other........................................................ 3415
Subsidies ...................................................... 72 74 65 80
Waived or reduced fees ....................................... 51 56 40 46
Reduced interest rates ........................................ 41 45 30 41
Waived PMI (private mortgage insurance) ..................... 30 33 21 39
Grants for down payment or other purposes .................... 23 24 19 24
Special ﬁnancial incentives to loan ofﬁcers or brokers ........... 21 15 28 46
Alteredterms .................................................. 88 89 84 88
More ﬂexible underwriting criteria ............................ 76 80 65 80
Second review of loan applicants .............................. 55 48 68 70
Longer term of loan .......................................... 10 12 10 0
Underwriting variances2
Y es ............................................................ 83 87 70 91
Variances (as a percentage of programs with any variances)
Lower down payment ........................................ 85 86 83 88
Alternative measures of credit quality (such as rent payments) ... 79 76 88 82
Higher debt ratios ............................................ 77 83 59 70
Lower cash reserve requirement ............................... 72 70 72 78
More ﬂexible requirements for employment history ............. 58 58 57 58
Lower standards for credit history ............................. 45 52 22 38
Provisions waived or reduced
PMI or credit guarantee .................................... 40 43 26 45
Collateral ................................................. 2223
Compensating balances .................................... 8 7 9 12
Less documentation .......................................... 14 16 5 20
Other........................................................ 4433
Note. See notes to table 2, except that here components do not sum to 100
because respondents could give more than one answer.
1. Responses to part B, question 14, ‘‘What special features or services does
your banking institution provide in connection with the program?’’
2. Responses to part B, question 17, ‘‘Are your banking institution’s custom-
ary underwriting standards...a l t e r e dunder [the] program?’’
720 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000higher delinquency and charge-off rates than pro-
grams at smaller institutions. For example, at year-
end 1999, the mean 30–89 day delinquency rate for
the CRA special mortgage programs of large banking
institutions was 3.07 percent, while the mean for
smaller institutions was 1.31 percent.
Proﬁtability
The survey sought information on the proﬁtability
of CRA special mortgage programs using return on
equity (ROE) as the preferred measure of proﬁtability
(see box ‘‘Measuring Proﬁtability’’). Discussions
7. Performance of CRA special mortgage programs, by size of banking institution, 1999
Percentage of loan dollars per program
Program performance measure All-institutions
estimate
Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars) Memo: All-institutions estimate1






Mean ............................ 1.94 1.31 3.04 3.07 2.95 1.86
Median .......................... .50 .00 1.88 2.01 2.40 1.44
90 or more days or nonaccruing
Mean ............................ 1.00 .59 1.72 1.70 1.42 .78
Median .......................... .07 .00 .91 1.06 .90 .53
Net charge-offs5
Mean .............................. .19 .09 .41 .36 .23 .14
Median ............................ .00 .00 .00 .05 .05 .02
Note. Results are for loans held in institution’s portfolio. See also notes to
table 2 and text box ‘‘Measures of Performance.’’
1. Only institutions that reported performance of their CRA special mortgage
program loans as well as of all their CRA-related mortgage loans and of their
total mortgage loans. The weights for calculating the all-institutions estimate
here are the number of CRA special mortgage programs offered by the
respondents.
2. All of institution’s CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance loans,
whether or not part of a CRA special lending program.
3. All of institution’s home purchase and reﬁnance loans, whether or not
CRA-related.
4. At year-end 1999.
5. Total net charge-offs of program loan dollars during 1999 divided by
average program loan dollars outstanding during 1999.
8. CRA special mortgage programs, grouped by size of banking institution and distributed by proﬁtability category of program,
1999
Percentage of programs
Program proﬁtability measure All-institutions
estimate
Size of banking institution (assets, in millions of dollars) Memo: All-institutions estimate1






Proﬁtable .......................... 29 34 19 20 37 61
Marginally proﬁtable ............... 35 38 35 20 40 33
Break-even ......................... 14 18 5 15 1 7
Marginally unproﬁtable ............. 15 7 29 29 18 0
Unproﬁtable........................ 7 4 12 16 4 0
T otal ............................ 100 100 100 100 100 100
Relative to all CRA-related
mortgage loans4
Lower ............................. 32 31 33 38 . . . . . .
Same .............................. 50 55 43 42 . . . . . .
Higher ............................. 17 15 24 20 . . . . . .
T otal............................. 100 100 100 100 . . . . . .
Relative to all mortgage loans5
Lower ............................. 59 49 77 78 . . . . . .
Same .............................. 36 51 4 18 . . . . . .
Higher ............................. 5 0 20 4 . . . . . .
T otal ............................ 100 100 100 100 . . . . . .
Note. Results are for estimates of 1999 proﬁtability. See also notes to table 2
and text box ‘‘Measuring Proﬁtability.’’
1. Only institutions that reported proﬁtability of CRA special mortgage
program loans as well as of all their CRA-related mortgage loans and of their
total mortgage loans. The weights for calculating the all-institutions estimate
here are the number of CRA special mortgage programs offered by the respon-
dents.
2. All of institution’s CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance loans,
whether or not part of a CRA special lending program.
3. All of institution’s home purchase and reﬁnance loans, whether or not
CRA-related.
4. Data derived from comparing the proﬁtability category (‘‘proﬁtable’’
through ‘‘unproﬁtable’’) in which respondents placed CRA special mortgage
program loans with the category in which they placed all of their CRA-related
home purchase and reﬁnance loans.
5. Data derived from comparing the proﬁtability category (‘‘proﬁtable’’
through ‘‘unproﬁtable’’) in which respondents placed CRA special mortgage
program loans with the category in which they placed all of their home purchase
and reﬁnance loans.
. . . Not applicable.
CRA Special Lending Programs 721with banking institutions in advance of the survey
suggested that some of them might have difﬁculty
calculating an ROE for individual loan programs.
Consequently, the survey also collected detailed
qualitative information on proﬁtability as well:
Banking institutions were asked if each individual
CRA special mortgage program was ‘‘proﬁtable,’’
‘‘marginally proﬁtable,’’ ‘‘break even,’’ ‘‘marginally
unproﬁtable,’’ or ‘‘unproﬁtable.’’ The same question
was asked for overall CRA-related home purchase
and reﬁnance lending and total home purchase and
reﬁnance lending. Only the qualitative data are pro-
vided here because they were in fact far more fre-
quently reported than were the quantitative data.
According to respondents, the majority (64 per-
cent) of CRA special mortgage programs were either
proﬁtable or marginally proﬁtable in 1999 (table 8).
Twenty-two percent of the programs were considered
either marginally unproﬁtable or unproﬁtable. Experi-
ence varies across reporting banking institutions
grouped by asset size. Compared with large and
medium-sized institutions, small institutions (assets
of between $0.950 billion and $4.999 billion)
reported that a higher percentage of their CRA mort-
gage programs were either proﬁtable or marginally
proﬁtable and that a lower percentage were either
marginally unproﬁtable or unproﬁtable in 1999. For
example, small institutions reported that 72 percent
of their CRA special lending programs were either
proﬁtable or marginally proﬁtable; large institutions
reported that only 40 percent of their programs were
either proﬁtable or marginally proﬁtable.
This pattern—smaller institutions being more
likely to report that their programs were
proﬁtable—is consistent with the broader pattern
observed for all CRA-related mortgage lending and
could be the result of a number of factors. As one
example, the pattern is consistent with the view that
smaller banking institutions have better knowledge of
their local markets and more familiarity with local
borrowers, which could result in less risky loan port-
folios derived from better assessments of the risks
Measures of Performance
Given a deﬁnition of performance in terms of delinquency
or default, one can measure performance in either of two
ways. One method is to consider performance at the loan
level by calculating the percentage of loans that are delin-
quent or in default. The second method is dollar-based: The
dollars or costs (in dollars) associated with delinquent or
defaulted loans are summed and compared with the total
dollars of loans outstanding. This article uses the dollar-
based measure of performance.
For the deﬁnition of loan performance, many people
are familiar with the terms ‘‘delinquency’’ and ‘‘default.’’
Delinquency occurs when a borrower fails to make a sched-
uled payment on a loan in a timely manner and in full.
Because loan payments are typically due monthly, the lend-
ing industry customarily categorizes delinquent loans as
either 30, 60, 90, or 120 or more days late depending on the
length of time the oldest unpaid loan payment has been
overdue.1
Technically, default occurs at the same time as delin-
quency; that is, a loan is in default as soon as the borrower
misses a scheduled payment. However, the term ‘‘default’’
is not generally used this way in the mortgage market,
where it has, instead, a variety of other deﬁnitions. Among
them are these four:
1. For purposes of reporting on delinquency experience in the Report of
Condition and Income (for commercial banks) and the Thrift Institution
Financial Report (for savings associations), institutions typically group delin-
quent loans into three broad categories: 30–89 days past due and still
accruing interest, 90 days or more delinquent and still accruing interest, and
nonaccruing.
• A lender forecloses on the property to gain title to the
asset securing the loan
• The borrower chooses to give the lender title to the
property securing the loan ‘‘in lieu of foreclosure’’
• The borrower sells the property securing the loan obli-
gation and makes less than full payment on the obligation
• The lender renegotiates or modiﬁes the terms of the
loan and forgives some or all of the delinquent principal and
interest payments. Loan modiﬁcations may take many
forms, including a change in the interest rate on the loan, an
extension of the length of the loan, and an adjustment of the
principal balance due.
Regardless of the deﬁnition of default used, a dollar-
based measure of it could be computed, but the measure
would not take into account the losses associated with
default, which may be more or less than the loan amount.
The actual losses are the unpaid principal and interest plus
ancillary out-of-pocket costs, such as those of collection,
less any amounts recovered.
As a consequence, a related dollar-based measure of
default—net charge-offs—is often used instead. For a given
loan, the net charge-off is the total dollars owed at default
(including the ancillary out-of-pocket costs) minus any
subsequent recoveries. The institution-based net charge-off
rate is calculated by summing its loan-level net charge-offs
over a period of time (a year, for example) and dividing this
amount by the average outstanding loan balances (including
delinquent loans) over the period. In this article, the institu-
tional net charge-off rate is used as the measure of default.
722 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000associated with prospective borrowers. As a second
example, the pattern is also consistent with the view
that smaller institutions are less likely to be involved
in mergers and hence are less subject to some of the
lending incentives associated with the CRA. In this
view, smaller institutions would be less inclined to
provide services that adversely affect proﬁtability.
The accuracy of conjectures such as these is
unknown.
The proﬁtability of CRA special mortgage pro-
grams can also be gauged using two types of com-
parisons with the proﬁtability of two broader groups
of loans examined in the analysis of performance: all
CRA-related home purchase and reﬁnance lending
and total home purchase and reﬁnance lending.
The ﬁrst type of comparison looks at the proﬁtabil-
ity distribution of CRA special mortgage programs
against the proﬁtability distribution of each of the
two broader groups of loans. This comparison ﬁnds
that while 64 percent of CRA special mortgage pro-
grams were reported to be at least marginally proﬁt-
able (table 8), 77 percent of all CRA-related mort-
gage lending and 94 percent of overall home pur-
chase and reﬁnance lending programs were reported
to be at least marginally proﬁtable (table 8, memo).
A second approach compares the 1999 proﬁtability
of CRA special mortgage programs with that of other
loan groups within each institution. That is, survey
responses by an individual institution regarding the
proﬁtability of each loan group were compared and
rank ordered. If the responses indicated that the prof-
itability category (proﬁtable, marginally proﬁtable,
break even, marginally unproﬁtable, unproﬁtable) of
two groups was the same, their relative proﬁtability
was considered to be equal. If an institution’s
responses placed two loan groups in different proﬁt-
ability categories, then relative proﬁtability was
judged based on which group was placed in the
higher proﬁtability category.
The results indicate that respondents placed 50 per-
cent of their CRA special mortgage programs in the
same proﬁtability category as their overall CRA-
related home purchase and reﬁnance lending. Of the
comparisons revealing a difference between CRA
special mortgage programs and overall CRA-related
home purchase and reﬁnance lending, roughly twice
the percentage of CRA special mortgage programs
were placed in a lower proﬁtability category than
were placed in a higher proﬁtability category (32 per-
cent versus 17 percent).
Differences are more prominent when comparisons
are made between the proﬁtability of CRA special
mortgage programs and total home purchase and
reﬁnance lending. Here, nearly 60 percent of CRA
special mortgage programs were placed in a lower
proﬁtability category.
Performance and proﬁtability are generally thought
to be positively correlated, and thus one would expect
that rank orderings of groups of loans by the two
criteria should be similar. But in the case of CRA
special mortgage programs, the similarities did not
hold. For proﬁtability, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams tended to be less proﬁtable than CRA-related
and total home purchase and reﬁnance lending. Con-
versely, for performance, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams performed better on average than overall CRA-
related home purchase and reﬁnance lending and
only slightly worse than overall lending by most
measures of performance. This apparent inconsis-
tency may be a consequence of additional, perhaps
costly, steps that institutions take as a part of their
CRA special mortgage programs to identify and work
with potential borrowers both before and after the
loan is extended. These efforts, which can include
enhanced marketing, counseling, and more intensive
monitoring of loan payments, may result in better
Measuring Proﬁtability
Measuring the proﬁtability of lending activities offers
special challenges. First, the proﬁt on a loan or program
can be calculated in various ways. For the survey, proﬁt
from a lending activity was measured using a comprehen-
sive deﬁnition that included all ‘‘revenues and costs
associated with overhead, origination, and servicing
costs; pricing; delinquency, default and losses; prepay-
ment; loan sales and purchases; and related customer
account business.’’ Although overhead was not deﬁned, it
was intended to include the costs of permanent and
working capital (sometimes referred to as a hurdle rate).
Total dollars of proﬁt may not be a meaningful mea-
sure of proﬁtability, as programs may differ in size, for
example. Therefore, proﬁtability is typically expressed as
a rate, with return on equity (ROE) and return on assets
(ROA) both commonly used. Calculating the ROE or the
ROA for a program requires the allocation of equity or
assets, respectively, to it. The ROA is commonly used
because it can often be more easily calculated for a given
point in time. However, the ROA cannot be used to
compare programs among institutions that have varying
propensities for selling their loans. For example, a bank-
ing institution that sells most of the loans it originates,
and thus has few assets, may misleadingly appear to be
extraordinarily proﬁtable when measured using the ROA.
Thus, comparing the ROA across programs in which
loans are sold at different rates can be misleading. Conse-
quently, ROE was selected as the more appropriate mea-
sure of proﬁtability to be used in the survey.
CRA Special Lending Programs 723loan performance but may also lower the proﬁtability
of the loans.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROGRAM FEATURES
AND PROGRAM PROFITABILITY
The features of CRA special mortgage programs,
how banking institutions deliver the services associ-
ated with them, and the characteristics of the banking
institutions themselves all may inﬂuence the proﬁt-
ability of these programs. The previous analysis indi-
cated that in 1999 the proﬁtability of CRA special
mortgage programs varied signiﬁcantly with the size
of the banking institution that operated them. Further
analysis (not shown) suggests that the proﬁtability of
these programs also varied with program size, mea-
sured by dollars of 1999 loan originations. Conse-
quently, the following analysis of the relationship
between program features and proﬁtability catego-
rizes programs by their size (large and small) and by
the size of the banking institution that instituted the
program.11 Too few small programs were reported on
by large institutions to support analysis, so ﬁgures for
this subcategory are not reported here; the small
number of such programs likely reﬂects the focus of
the survey, which asked banking institutions to report
detailed information on only their ﬁve largest
programs.
11. Large programs had loan originations in 1999 exceeding
$2 million; small programs had 1999 originations of less than
$2 million.
9. Selected characteristics of CRA special mortgage programs, grouped by size of banking institution and size of program
and distributed by proﬁtability category of program, 1999
A. All banking institutions
Percentage of programs
Characteristic
All programs Small programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 64 14 22 67 16 17 60 11 29
Reason for program establishment or
beneﬁt of program
Help earn a CRA rating of
‘‘Satisfactory’’ or
‘‘Outstanding’’ ................. 64 15 20 65 18 16 63 11 26
Respond to community credit needs
or promote community growth
and stability ................... 63 14 23 66 17 17 59 11 30
Improve institution’s public image ... 61 10 29 64 10 26 57 10 33
Earn additional proﬁts or identify
proﬁtablenewmarkets.......... 74 7 19 86 3 10 64 10 25
Maintain market share in face of
increased competition1 ......... 63 12 25 73 12 15 55 12 33
Minimize likelihood of adverse
public comment on
CRA record ................... 60 10 30 65 6 29 55 14 32
Year program established
Before 1990 ........................ 38 22 40 *** 44 10 46
1991–94 ........................... 59 11 31 67 12 22 45 9 46
1995–97 ........................... 63 17 20 57 21 22 69 12 18




Services ........................... 65 12 23 72 14 14 58 10 32
Subsidies .......................... 61 16 23 62 17 21 59 15 25





and cash reserves ............ 64 15 22 64 18 19 64 11 26
Altered standards for credit
quality and employment
history ...................... 66 12 22 67 11 21 65 12 24
Waivers or reductions in
security requirements ........ 58 17 25 61 18 21 52 15 33
Multiple variances ................ 64 14 22 68 16 16 60 11 29
Note. Covers each institution’s estimate of 1999 proﬁtability of its ﬁve
largest programs. For the small programs, 1999 loan originations were less than
$2 million; for the large programs, originations were at least $2 million. For
smaller banking institutions (tables 9.B and 9.C), year-end 1999 assets were
less than $30 billion; for larger institutions, assets were at least $30 billion.
‘‘Proﬁtable’’ includes ‘‘marginally proﬁtable’’; ‘‘unproﬁtable’’ includes ‘‘mar-
ginally unproﬁtable.’’ See also notes to table 2; values for each set of three
proﬁtability categories may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
1. Also includes reasons reported under ‘‘other’’ in the survey.
2. For detailed list, see table 6.
* Data received on ﬁve or fewer programs.
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are taken into account, the proﬁtability of CRA
special mortgage programs does not appear to
have varied signiﬁcantly with the reason for which
a program was established or the beneﬁt afforded
by a program (tables 9.A, B, and C). For almost
every reason cited by banking institutions for creat-
ing a program and for almost every beneﬁt, the
proportion of programs reported to be proﬁtable and
unproﬁtable is quite similar to that of the ‘‘all pro-
grams’’ category (ﬁrst line of tables). The compari-
son holds even for programs that were speciﬁcally
established to achieve a ‘‘Satisfactory’’ or ‘‘Outstand-
ing’’ CRA rating.
Programs established as a source of additional
proﬁts or to identify proﬁtable new markets are an
exception to the pattern. For each combination of
program size and institution size, except large pro-
grams at smaller banking institutions (table 9.B),
the proportion of programs established to be a pro-
ﬁt source that is reported to have been proﬁtable
was substantially higher than the proportion in the
all-programs category. Another exception is small
CRA special mortgage programs at smaller banking
institutions (table 9.B) that were established, at least
in part, to improve an institution’s public image or to
minimize the likelihood of adverse public comment
on the institution’s CRA record; these programs were
more likely to be unproﬁtable than the all-programs
category for smaller institutions.
The proﬁtability of CRA special mortgage pro-
grams appears to vary with the age of the program,
with newer programs generally being more proﬁtable
than older programs.
As noted earlier, CRA special mortgage programs
carry a wide range of features and underwriting
variances (table 6). For the most part, no close rela-





All programs Small programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 67 14 20 67 17 17 66 10 24
Reason for program establishment or
beneﬁt of program
Help earn a CRA rating of
‘‘Satisfactory’’ or
‘‘Outstanding’’ ................. 68 15 17 65 18 16 72 9 19
Respond to community credit needs
or promote community growth
and stability ................... 66 14 20 66 17 17 64 10 26
Improve institution’s public image ... 64 9 27 64 10 26 64 7 29
Earn additional proﬁts or identify
proﬁtablenewmarkets ......... 77 6 18 87 3 9 67 8 25
Maintain market share in face of
increased competition .......... 67 11 22 72 12 15 60 10 30
Minimize likelihood of adverse
public comment on
CRA record ................... 65 9 27 65 6 29 64 12 24
Year program established
Before 1990 ........................ 46 16 38 *** 55 0 45
1991–94 ........................... 62 10 29 66 12 22 52 5 44
1995–97 ........................... 64 18 19 57 22 21 72 13 15




Services ........................... 68 12 21 72 15 14 63 8 28
Subsidies .......................... 64 16 20 62 17 21 67 14 19





and cash reserves ............ 67 15 19 63 18 19 73 9 18
Altered standards for credit
quality and employment
history ...................... 70 11 19 67 11 21 76 10 14
Waivers or reductions in
security requirements ........ 63 16 21 61 18 21 70 9 21
Multiple variances ................ 67 14 20 68 16 16 65 10 25
Note. See notes to table 9.A.
CRA Special Lending Programs 725variances and program proﬁtability (tables 9.A, B,
and C). Even when a banking institution offered
some form of subsidy, such as a reduced interest rate
or a fee waiver or reduction, CRA special mortgage
programs generally were not reported to be more
unproﬁtable than the all-programs category for the
same size category of program and institution. These
service categories reﬂect, however, only the existence
of a feature or subsidy and not necessarily its amount
or extent. The survey collected no further information
on these items.
Responses indicated that the participation of third
parties in CRA special mortgage programs was some-
times related to program proﬁtability, depending on
the type and number of third parties involved and
the nature of their role in the program (tables 10.A
and B). Overall, among programs with a third party,
67 percent were proﬁtable compared with 54 percent
of programs with no third party. But CRA special
mortgage programs at large banking institutions
(table 10.A) were less likely to be proﬁtable (more
likely to be unproﬁtable) when a third party was
involved in the program than when one was not. By
contrast, programs were more frequently proﬁtable
when programs with third parties were conducted by
smaller banking institutions (table 10.A) and when
third parties participated in small programs (table
10.B), although the frequency of unproﬁtability was
about the same for both groups.
Programs that exclusively involved government
entities as third parties generally appeared to be more
proﬁtable than other programs. Overall, 75 percent of
CRA special mortgage programs that involved only
a government entity were reported to be proﬁtable
(table 10.A), compared with 64 percent of all CRA
special mortgage programs. Although half of such
programs at large banks were reported to be unproﬁt-
able, large banks reported only a small number of
third-party programs that exclusively involved a gov-
ernment entity (data not shown).
The results for other types of third-party involve-
ment are not consistent. For example, large programs
(table 10.B) that exclusively involved a government-
sponsored entity (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the
Federal Home Loan Banks) were less likely to be
reported as proﬁtable than large programs considered
as a group (22 percent versus 60 percent). How-
ever, large programs that involved a government-
9. Selected characteristics of CRA special mortgage programs, grouped by size of banking institution and size of program




All programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ................................... 40 15 45 38 15 46
Reason for program establishment or beneﬁt
of program
Help earn a CRA rating of ‘‘Satisfactory’’ or
‘‘Outstanding’’ .............................. 35 16 49 32 17 51
Respond to community credit needs or
promote community growth and stability ..... 41 15 44 39 16 45
Improve institution’s public image ................ 38 18 45 38 18 45
Earn additional proﬁts or identify
proﬁtablenewmarkets ...................... 53 18 28 55 19 26
Maintain market share in face of increased
competition ................................. 41 18 41 38 19 43
Minimize likelihood of adverse public comment
on CRA record ............................. 31 17 52 31 17 52
Year program established
Before 1990 ..................................... 0 50 50 0 50 50
1991–94 ........................................ 29 21 50 23 23 54
1995–97 ........................................ 58 8 33 59 9 32
1998–99 ........................................ ******
Program features and underwriting variances
provided by bank
Services ........................................ 42 16 42 40 16 44
Subsidies ....................................... 39 17 43 37 19 44
Alteredterms.................................... 40 13 48 37 13 50
Underwriting variances
Changes in required down payment, debt ratios,
and cash reserves ......................... 42 15 44 39 15 46
Altered standards for credit quality and
employment history ....................... 40 17 43 39 17 44
Waivers or reductions in security requirements .. 21 25 54 19 26 56
Multiple variances ............................. 42 15 43 40 16 44
Note. See notes to table 9.A.
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more likely to be proﬁtable than large programs con-
sidered as a group (74 percent versus 60 percent).
Overall, the number of third parties involved in a
CRA special mortgage program did not seem to bear
a strong relationship to program proﬁtability.
As noted, third parties conduct a wide range of
activities in support of CRA special mortgage pro-
10. Third-party involvement in CRA special mortgage programs, grouped by size of banking institution and size of program
and distributed by proﬁtability category of program, 1999
A. By size of banking institution
Percentage of programs
Third-party types and activities
All-institutions estimate Smaller Large
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 64 14 22 67 14 20 40 15 45
Presence of third parties
Y es ................................ 67 9 23 71 9 20 37 15 48
No................................. 54 26 19 54 28 18 56 11 33
Type of third party when program
has only one type of third party
Any ............................... 67 5 28 71 5 24 21 11 68
Government ..................... 75 3 22 78 2 20 33 17 50
Government-sponsored ........... 47 10 43 49 10 41 ***
Nonproﬁt ........................ 61 7 31 67 7 26 13 13 75
Other............................ 91 0 9 ******
Type of third party when program
has multiple types of third parties
Any ............................... 68 16 16 72 16 12 48 19 33
Government ..................... 70 14 16 75 13 12 50 21 29
Government-sponsored ........... 73 13 14 74 13 13 71 12 18
Nonproﬁt ........................ 67 16 17 73 17 11 48 16 36
Other............................ 80 16 4 82 15 3 67 22 11
Third-party activities1
Services ........................... 67 9 24 71 9 20 37 15 48
Subsidies .......................... 70 12 19 75 10 15 38 18 44
Assumption of risk ................. 74 10 17 83 7 10 32 19 48
Note. See general note to table 9.A.
1. For list, see table 5.
* Data received on ﬁve or fewer programs.
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B. By size of program
Percentage of programs
Third-party types and activities
All programs Small Large
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 64 14 22 67 16 17 60 11 29
Presence of third parties ............
Y es ................................ 67 9 23 74 9 17 59 9 32
No................................. 54 26 19 48 36 16 62 15 23
Type of third party when program
has only one type of third party
Any ............................... 67 5 28 75 3 22 54 9 37
Government ..................... 75 3 22 76 0 24 74 6 20
Government-sponsored ........... 47 10 43 64 0 36 22 24 54
Nonproﬁt ........................ 61 7 31 72 8 20 33 5 62
Other............................ 91 0 9 ******
Type of third party when program
has multiple types of third parties
Any ............................... 68 16 16 70 24 6 66 10 24
Government ..................... 70 14 16 73 20 7 67 10 23
Government-sponsored ........... 73 13 14 72 22 7 74 8 18
Nonproﬁt ........................ 67 16 17 67 33 0 66 9 25
Other............................ 80 16 4 71 24 5 91 6 3
Third-party activities
Services ........................... 67 9 24 73 10 17 59 9 32
Subsidies .......................... 70 12 19 76 11 12 62 12 26
Assumption of risk ................. 74 10 17 83 10 7 66 9 26
Note. See notes to table 10.A.
CRA Special Lending Programs 727grams (table 5), and these activities appear to be
related to program proﬁtability (tables 10.A and B).
Third-party assumption of risk was positively related
to program proﬁtability. This relationship was stron-
gest for programs at smaller banking institutions and
for small programs. For example, 83 percent of the
programs at smaller banks that involve the assump-
tion of risk by a third party were reported to be
proﬁtable (table 10.A), compared with 67 percent for
all programs at such banks. Third-party provision of
services and subsidies also appeared to contribute to
program proﬁtability, although these relationships
were not as strong as that for the assumption of risk.
Survey results indicate that characteristics of a
banking institution besides its size are related to the
proﬁtability of CRA special mortgage programs
(tables 11.A, B, and C). Banking institutions with
overall proﬁtability above the median were more
likely to have had large programs that were proﬁtable
than were institutions with overall proﬁtability below
the median (table 11.A).12 However, the reverse is
true for small programs at smaller banking institu-
tions (table 11.B).
Merger activity also appears to matter. In all com-
binations of program size and banking institution
size, programs that were established in a year in
which the banking institution was engaged in merg-
ers or acquisitions were more likely to have been
reported as unproﬁtable than programs established in
years in which the banking institution did not merge.
Whether or not the banking institution is part of a
multibank holding company appears to matter only
for small programs at smaller banking institutions
(table 11.B): Such programs at institutions that are
part of multibank organizations tend to be less proﬁt-
able (or more unproﬁtable) than programs at indepen-
dent institutions.
Finally, with the exception of large programs at
large banking institutions (table 11.C), a banking
institution’s CRA performance rating does not appear
to be strongly related to program proﬁtability. For
large programs at large institutions, the percentage of
programs reported as proﬁtable for institutions with
outstanding CRA ratings was the same as for institu-
tions with satisfactory ratings. However, somewhat
surprisingly, the proportion reported to have been
unproﬁtable is much higher for those with satisfac-
tory ratings than for those with outstanding ratings.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The survey and resulting data provide new and
systematic information about the characteristics
and the role of CRA special mortgage programs in
the lending activities of banking institutions. In par-
ticular, the information provides opportunities to
determine the factors that inﬂuence the performance
12. The proﬁtability of each institution was measured as 1999
return on equity and then compared with the median 1999 return
on equity of the original sample of the 500 largest retail banking
institutions.
11. Selected characteristics of institutions with CRA special mortgage programs, grouped by size of banking institution and size
of program and distributed by proﬁtability category of program, 1999
A. All banking institutions
Percentage of programs
Characteristic
All programs Small programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 64 14 22 67 16 17 60 11 29
Proﬁtability of banking institution1
Above median ...................... 71 3 27 55 5 40 80 1 18
Below median ...................... 62 17 21 69 19 12 51 15 34
Merger by banking institution in
year program was established
(for mergers since 1990)2
Y es ................................ 60 9 31 68 7 25 45 11 44
No................................. 66 17 17 66 23 11 66 11 23
Structure of banking institution
Multibank holding company ......... 60 9 32 60 10 31 59 8 33
Other .............................. 69 20 11 74 23 3 61 15 24
CRA rating of banking institution
‘‘Satisfactory’’ ...................... 67 12 21 70 15 15 63 9 28
‘‘Outstanding’’ ..................... 60 16 24 63 18 19 57 13 30
Note. See notes to table 9.A.
1. Return on equity in 1999 compared with 1999 return on equity of the
500 largest retail banking institutions.
2. Includes acquisitions by an institution’s holding company.
728 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000and proﬁtability of these programs and to better
understand the role of speciﬁc program features
and arrangements with third parties. However, the
survey data do not address all issues in this regard,
and the foregoing analysis has some important
limitations.
First, by design, the survey collected detailed infor-
mation on only a subset of CRA special lending
programs from a fairly narrow group of lenders and
programs. Only the ﬁve largest programs at each of
the largest 500 retail banking institutions were cov-
ered in the survey; the characteristics and proﬁtability
of smaller programs at these institutions or of pro-
grams at other banking institutions may have differed.
Second, the survey collected performance and
proﬁtability information for 1999 only. However,
1999 lending experiences may not be representative
of those of other years. For example, program per-
formance may have been better in 1999—a year of
ongoing economic expansion—than might have been
expected during a year of economic weakness. In
addition, some of the programs are relatively new,
and their long-run performance and proﬁtability may
not be fully reﬂected in the survey data.
11.—Continued
B. Smaller banking institutions
Percentage of programs
Characteristic
All programs Small programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ...................... 67 14 20 67 17 17 66 10 24
Proﬁtability of banking institution
Above median ...................... 73 2 26 57 5 39 84 0 16
Below median ...................... 65 17 18 69 19 13 57 15 28
Merger by banking institution
in year program was established
(for mergers since 1990)
Y es ................................ 65 8 27 68 7 24 55 11 34
No................................. 68 17 16 66 23 11 69 9 21
Structure of banking institution
Multibank holding company ......... 63 7 29 60 10 31 69 4 27
Other .............................. 70 21 10 74 23 3 63 16 21
CRA rating of banking institution
‘‘Satisfactory’’ ...................... 69 13 17 70 15 15 69 10 21
‘‘Outstanding’’ ..................... 63 15 22 63 18 18 63 10 27
Note. See notes to table 11.A.
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C. Large banking institutions
Percentage of programs
Characteristic
All programs Large programs
Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable Proﬁtable Break-even Unproﬁtable
All programs ................................... 40 15 45 38 15 46
Proﬁtability of banking institution
Above median ................................... 55 9 36 60 10 30
Below median ................................... 36 16 48 33 17 50
Merger by banking institution
in year program was established
(for mergers since 1990)
Y es ............................................. 33 10 57 30 11 59
No.............................................. 48 20 32 48 20 32
Structure of banking institution
Multibank holding company ...................... 39 16 45 37 17 46
Other ........................................... 45 9 45 45 9 45
CRA rating of banking institution
‘‘Satisfactory’’ ................................... 44 4 52 39 4 57
‘‘Outstanding’’ .................................. 37 23 40 38 24 38
Note. See notes to table 11.A.
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leaves statistics such as means imprecisely measured.
These statistics should be viewed with some caution.
Fourth, the measurement of proﬁtability poses
some difﬁculties. Although the survey instructed
respondents to measure program proﬁtability in a
comprehensive manner, there is no way of determin-
ing the extent to which all banking institutions did so.
Some institutions may have included factors in their
assessment of proﬁtability that other institutions did
not. Moreover, because many respondents could not
provide quantitative answers regarding the proﬁtabil-
ity of their programs, qualitative answers were high-
lighted in this article. The quantitative distinctions
underlying these qualitative responses may differ
from institution to institution. These issues raise con-
cerns regarding the degree to which responses across
banking institutions can be compared.
Fifth, no deﬁnition of a ‘‘CRA special mortgage
program’’ is universally accepted. Banking institu-
tions may have used different criteria by which to
distinguish programs or to identify those that were
established to enhance CRA performance. For exam-
ple, one institution might have considered a program
that operates in three geographic markets to be a
single program, whereas another institution might
have reported that program as three separate pro-
grams distinguished by the markets in which the
programs operate.
Finally, this article presents only a portion of the
information that would be needed to assess the value
and importance of CRA special lending programs—
only those programs focused on home purchase and
reﬁnance lending are covered. Further, no informa-
tion is presented on the beneﬁts of these lending
programs to local communities and borrowers or on
the costs incurred by third parties in supporting such
activities. Any comprehensive assessment of the full
costs and beneﬁts of these programs would need to
consider these factors.
SUMMARY
This article presents new and systematic information
on CRA special lending programs obtained from
responses to a recent Federal Reserve survey on the
performance and proﬁtability of CRA-related lend-
ing. CRA special lending programs help an institu-
tion seek out and assist borrowers, typically among
lower-income populations, and thereby help the insti-
tution meet its obligations under the CRA.
The survey, which focused on the ﬁve largest pro-
grams at each of the surveyed institutions, found that
72 percent of the programs were devoted exclusively
to loans for the purchase or reﬁnancing of one- to
four-family homes. The analysis in this article con-
cerns these programs, referred to as CRA special
mortgage programs.
For most institutions, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams are relatively small. However, for about one-
sixth of the institutions that responded to the survey,
lending under CRA special mortgage programs
accounted for more than 40 percent of the institu-
tion’s overall CRA-related mortgage lending.
Banking institutions cite many reasons for estab-
lishing or participating in CRA special mortgage
programs. The two most frequently cited are respond-
ing to the credit needs of the local community and
promoting community growth and stability. The third
most frequently cited, obtaining either a ‘‘Satisfac-
tory’’ or ‘‘Outstanding’’ CRA rating, is mentioned for
about three-fourths of the programs, but it is cited as
the only reason for just 1 percent of the programs.
About three-fourths of the programs involve the
activities of third parties. The main activities are
grants for down payments or other purposes and
other services and subsidies that reduce the costs of
banking institutions in extending credit to the popula-
tions served by the special programs. The programs
also have a wide range of features involving the
banking institutions themselves, including ﬂexible
underwriting, special outreach and marketing activi-
ties, and subsidies of fees and loan rates.
Regardless of the comparison made or the perfor-
mance measure used, CRA special mortgage pro-
grams appear to perform better (that is, the loans
extended through them have lower delinquency and
net charge-off rates) than overall CRA-related home
purchase and reﬁnance lending. Results are less con-
sistent when comparisons are made with an institu-
tion’s total home purchase and reﬁnance lending
(both CRA-related and not CRA-related). Median
delinquency and charge-off rates are lower for loans
in CRA special mortgage programs than for overall
mortgage lending; however, average rates for these
measures of performance are all higher.
The performance of CRA special mortgage pro-
grams appears to vary with the asset size of the
banking institution operating the program. On aver-
age, CRA special mortgage programs at large bank-
ing institutions (assets of $30 billion or more) had
higher delinquency and charge-off rates than pro-
grams at smaller institutions.
According to respondents, the majority of CRA
special mortgage programs (64 percent) are either
proﬁtable or marginally proﬁtable. About one-fourth
of the programs are considered either marginally
unproﬁtable or unproﬁtable. However, respondents
730 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 2000placed three-ﬁfths of the programs in a proﬁtability
category lower than that in which they placed over-
all mortgage lending. In addition, respondents placed
50 percent of the programs in the same proﬁtabil-
ity category in which they placed their overall
CRA-related mortgage lending; for the other half
of the programs, twice as many were placed in a
lower proﬁtability category as were placed in a higher
category.
As with performance, the proﬁtability of CRA
special mortgage programs also appears to vary with
an institution’s size. Whether measured on an abso-
lute or relative basis, programs of large banking
institutions are more likely to be unproﬁtable (or to
be ranked less proﬁtable) than are programs of
smaller institutions.
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